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Executive Summary
We have analyzed the likely impact on voter turnout should 
Nebraska adopt Election Day Registration (EDR).1 Under the 
system proposed in Nebraska, eligible voters who miss the 18-day 
deadline for registering by mail may be able to register to vote on 
Election Day.2 Availability of Election Day Registration (EDR) 
procedures should give voters who have not previously registered 
the opportunity to vote. Consistent with existing research on the 
impact of EDR in the other states that use this process, we find that 
EDR would likely lead to substantial increases in voter turnout. This 
report presents the following estimates of increases in turnout for 
Nebraska, and for specific groups of Nebraska citizens under EDR:3 
Overall turnout could go up by 5.4 percent.
Turnout among those aged 18 to 25 could 
increase by 10.6 percent.
Turnout for those who have moved in the last 
six months could increase by 9.5 percent.
Turnout for Latinos could increase by 9.0 
percent.
Turnout for African Americans could 
increase by 6.0 percent.
Turnout among poor and middle-income 
citizens could increase by 8.1 and 6.4 percent, 
respectively, while turnout among the wealth-
iest citizens would likely increase by 3.7 
percent.
Introduction
The purpose of voter registration in the United States is to make 
sure that only eligible citizens vote. Voter registration also provides 
election officials with convenient lists they can use to notify voters 
about upcoming elections, as well as other pertinent information 
about elections and voting. Lastly, when individuals enter a polling 
place, a voter registration list gives poll workers the information 
they need to authenticate voters before they cast ballots.
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2At the same time, the process of voter registration imposes costs on voters—such as forcing voters to register well 
in advance of an election, which might involve a complicated process of determining where and how to register—
and these costs have been shown in various studies to serve as barriers to many potential voters.4 In Nebraska, 
eligible citizens who wish to register by mail must do so at least 18 days before the election. For some eligible 
citizens, especially those who have recently moved, requiring registration before Election Day might make it very 
difficult for them to cast a ballot. Given that non-registered, but otherwise eligible citizens are not on the lists that 
election officials or other political groups use to mobilize voters, some non-registered eligible citizens may not be 
aware of an upcoming election or about how and when they can register to vote.
In the last few decades, the costs associated with voter registration have been the focus of significant federal 
legislation. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), signed into law in 1993, required states to provide voter 
registration forms in places where residents register their motor vehicles, and in other state agencies like public 
assistance offices. The NVRA also required that states allow for mail-in voter registration. More recently, in 2002, 
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) attempted to significantly improve voter registration practices across the nation 
by requiring states to develop computerized, statewide voter registries, and also requiring all states to adopt provi-
sional or “fail-safe” voting.
Currently, there are six states that have substantial experience allowing eligible citizens to register to vote on 
Election Day: Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin and Wyoming.5 Iowa, Montana and North 
Carolina have also recently adopted EDR or similar procedures. The six states with substantial EDR experience 
have shown that Election Day Registration is an effective way to increase voter participation without complicating 
election administration or leading to increased voter fraud. Research regarding the experiences of these other six 
states has shown that:
Voter participation is somewhere between 3 and 6 percentage points higher than were 
EDR not used in those states; 
Citizens who have recently moved or are younger find it easier to register and vote; 
Election administration, when EDR is thoughtfully implemented, can be improved and 
EDR does not undermine the Election Day experience of poll workers or voters; and
There is no evidence that the prospects for election fraud are increased.6 
Thus, based on the experience of these states, previous research we have conducted, academic research on voter 
participation and Election Day Registration, and new research we present below, we believe that if appropriately 
implemented, Nebraska will have a positive experience once Election Day Registration is in place. In particular, 
we show below that both voter registration and turnout are estimated to increase—possibly by 5.4 percent—once 
Election Day Registration is implemented in Nebraska. Having more voters on the rolls will improve election 
administration and give election officials throughout the state better information when they want to contact voters 
about upcoming elections and provide them with related information. Finally, increasing voter participation should 
lead to a stronger democracy and a strengthened civic culture in Nebraska.
EDR, Registration and Turnout
Determining a voter’s eligibility before allowing them to cast a vote has a long history in the United States. Studies 
of early American political history have shown that eligibility was determined by party observers at the polling 
places, who could challenge a voter’s ability to participate in an election.7 Pre-election voter registration practices 
began early in American history, but became widespread in the decades after the Civil War.8 In some states voter 
registration requirements were part of an array of measures, including poll taxes and literacy tests, that were used to 
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3disenfranchise segments of the potential electorate, including immigrants, the poor, and minorities. Early registra-
tion practices were themselves often quite restrictive, such as requiring annual or periodic, in-person registration at 
a county office during weekday business hours.9 
Liberalization of voter registration laws began with the civil rights movement, culminating in the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The VRA eliminated many of the systematic barriers that made registration and 
voting difficult for poor and minority voters, and empowered the federal government to oversee the elimination of 
voting restrictions. Many states substantially reformed their registration and voting procedures after passage of the 
VRA.
But even with these reforms in some states, many other states continued to use restrictive registration prac-
tices after the passage of the VRA. A patchwork quilt of registration practices developed in many states and across 
the nation as many local election officials had substantial discretion over registration and voting procedures. And 
research by scholars showed that many voting and registration practices, particularly the practice of requiring 
registration well in advance of Election Day, substantially reduced voter turnout.10 This led to the enactment of 
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), through which Congress sought to simplify the registration 
process and to improve the integrity of voter registries. Key to the NVRA was an expansion of avenues by which a 
citizen could register to vote, including registration by mail, at departments of motor vehicles, and in state public 
assistance offices. The NVRA also promulgated new rules regarding procedures for the removal of voters from the 
registration rolls. 
More recently, problems in the 2000 presidential election led to additional federal efforts to reform the voter 
registration process. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) directed that states develop a “centralized, interac-
tive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level” (Section 
303(a)(1)(B)). HAVA also required that states implement “fail-safe”, or provisional voting procedures, if they did 
not already have them, so that otherwise eligible citizens could cast a provisional ballot rather than be disenfran-
chised due to the omission of their names from the voter registry.
Six states had Election Day Registration in place when HAVA was enacted. Generally speaking, states with EDR 
have higher rates of voter registration and turnout than do states that do not have EDR. Based on data collected by 
the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2004 states with EDR reported registration rates of 86.4 percent, while states without 
EDR had reported registration rates of only 79.1 percent.11 These numbers are consistent with data from previous 
elections: states with EDR have consistently had higher registration rates.12 And EDR states had demonstrably 
higher levels of voter turnout in 2004. According to the official voting statistics reported by secretaries of state, and 
the U.S. Census Bureau estimates of state population, EDR states had a voter turnout rate of 70.3 percent in 2004, 
while non-EDR states had a turnout rate of only 54.7 percent.13
Were Nebraska to implement Election Day Registration, voter participation could increase substantially in a 
presidential election year like 2004 or 2008. Furthermore, voter participation might increase strongly among sectors 
of the population that typically turnout at lower rates, such as newly relocated eligible citizens or young voters, as 
they are the types of voters that previous research has shown are helped by EDR.
EDR in Nebraska
In 2004, voter turnout in Nebraska was close to the average among states. According to data compiled by the 
Census Bureau, 59.3 percent of voting age Nebraskans voted in 2004, and 81.2 percent of eligible Nebraskans were 
registered to vote.14 To estimate the potential impact of EDR, this study relies on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
42004 Current Population Survey (CPS) and uses a methodology that we have employed in past research on voter 
turnout, which is documented in the technical appendix of this report. In summary, we estimate statistical models 
predicting whether individual respondents in the 2004 CPS report being registered and whether they voted. In this 
estimation, we control for many factors, including the voter registration process in the state. Estimations control 
for the respondents’ age and levels of education, whether or not they have moved recently, their ethnic background, 
and whether or not they are a native-born citizen or have been recently naturalized. These estimates are then used 
to simulate the outcome of Nebraska using EDR in the 2004 election.15 
Estimates of EDR’s potential effect on voter turnout in the 2004 election in Nebraska are provided in 
Table 1.16 First, the analysis presented here predicts that Nebraska’s turnout would increase under EDR. Most impor-
tantly, this analysis projects a 5.4 percent increase in voter turnout if Nebraska moves to EDR. 
Data suggests other substantial increases in voter turnout for those who might be most affected by EDR:
Turnout among those aged 18 to 25 could increase by 10.6 percent under EDR.
Turnout for those who have moved in the last six months could increase by 9.5 percent 
under EDR.
Turnout for Latinos could increase by 9.0 percent.
Turnout for African Americans could increase by 6 percent under EDR.
Over 45,000 additional poor and middle income voters would go to the polls, compared 
to an additional 21,000 voters in the top half of the income range.
Over 55,000 additional citizens who do not have college degrees would vote compared to 
only 12,000 new voters with college degrees.
Thus, those eligible citizens who are most typically affected by Election Day Registration in other states would 
also be strongly affected in Nebraska.
Conclusion
One of the more consistent conclusions in the study of voter turnout over the last 35 years has been that making 
the registration and voting process easier will increase turnout among eligible voters.17 This analysis of the impact of 
EDR in Nebraska is another piece of evidence supporting this claim. By comparing voter turnout in states with EDR 
and states without EDR, it is possible to estimate the impact EDR would have in Nebraska. Adoption of EDR could 
raise turnout by 5.4 percent according to these estimates; it could raise turnout substantially more among groups 
such as young voters and voters who have moved in the period preceding the election. 
The trend in the United States has been to ease the barrier that registration places on voting by moving the dead-
line closer to Election Day. Moving towards Election Day Registration would ease that barrier for thousands of citi-
zens in Nebraska, and bring more participants into the democratic process. 
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5Technical Appendix
To estimate the impact of EDR in Nebraska, we analyzed individual survey data collected by the Census Bureau. 
Each month the Census Bureau surveys approximately 50,000 households in the Current Population Survey. In 
even numbered years the November survey includes a battery of questions asking respondents whether or not they 
were registered to vote, how they registered, and if they voted. The CPS is considered to be the “gold standard” of 
datasets for analyzing individual-level factors affecting turnout, and turnout across states. The Census Bureau has 
a higher response rate than any other survey and the sample size is large enough to draw statistically valid samples 
within a state. Whereas the typical media poll might have 1,500 respondents nationwide, the November 2004 CPS 
included 1319 respondents from Nebraska. 
The model used here incorporates factors that have been shown in extensive research on voter turnout to be 
correlated with an individual’s decision on whether or not to vote. It includes categorical variables to indicate 
whether or not the person is in one of five age groups: 18 to 25, 26 to 35, 36 to 45, 46 to 60, or 61 to 75. Also 
included are categorical variables for education placing the respondent as having less than a high school degree, 
a high school degree, some college education, a college degree or beyond. For annual family income, we include 
brackets of less than $20,000, between $20,000 and $40,000, between $40,000 and $60,000, and above $60,000. The 
respondent’s ethnicity is measured as white, African American or Latino. Also included were variables indicating 
whether or not the respondent was a naturalized citizen, and if so, whether they had come to the United States 
within 10 years of the 2004 election or within 16 years of the 2004 election. A variable for whether the respondent 
lives in an urban or rural area was included as well.
Also included were variables at the state level for the number of days before the election that registration closes 
and for the presence of a competitive election. These include three categorical variables indicating the presence (or 
absence) respectively of: a senate, gubernatorial, or presidential race within the state that was decided by a margin 
of 5 percent or less. 
To be able to determine the impact of EDR on particular groups of the population, and because we expect that 
EDR will have larger effects on those who have the most difficulty meeting the burden of pre-election registra-
tion, this study includes interaction terms between the availability of EDR and the respondent’s age, education and 
income, as well as whether or not the respondent had moved previously and whether the respondent was a native 
born citizen or a naturalized citizen (and if so, whether recently immigrated or not).
Given these specifications, we estimated the model on all respondents in the CPS. Doing this provided esti-
mates of the model parameters. We then computed the predicted probability of each respondent in their sample in 
Nebraska, voting under that current legal conditions—that is the state’s requirement that voters register well before 
Election Day. We then computed the probability of each respondent in the sample in Nebraska voting under the 
counterfactual condition that Nebraska had Election Day Registration available. By aggregating those predicted 
probabilities over different sub-groups of interest, we were then able to estimate the impact of EDR on any sub-
group within the population, or estimate the impact of EDR on all voting age persons in Nebraska. We assume that 
the future impact of EDR in Nebraska will closely resemble the impact of EDR as implemented elsewhere.
6Table 1: Simulated 2004 Turnout Increases in Nebraska under EDR 
Estimated 
Percentage Point 
Increase with EDR
Estimated Additional 
Votes with EDR
Entire State 5.4 67,058 
Persons who have moved in the last 6 months 9.5 12,927
Persons Age 18-25 10.6 22,065
Persons Age 26-35 5.7 12,380
Persons Age 36-45 4.5 11,183
Persons Age 46-60 4.1 12,959
Persons Age 61-75 3.3  5,071
Persons Age 76-90 3.7 3,401
African Americans 6.0 2,148
Latinos 9.0 4,888
Whites 5.2 59,097
Naturalized Citizens 10.1 3,893
 
Lower Income ($0-$20,000 household income) 6.4 14,286
Middle Income ($20,000 - $40,000) 8.1 31,394
Upper Income ($40,000 - $60,000) 3.1 8,342
Top Income ($60,000 and above) 3.7 13,036
Rural 5.2 25,810
Urban 5.6 41,249
Persons with grade school education 7.4  8,235
Persons who are high school graduates 6.1 26,248
Persons with some college education 5.1 20,955
College graduates 4.1 11,619
Source: Computed by authors, based on analysis of the Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census, November 2004. 
7Table 2: Simulated 2004 Registration Increases in Nebraska under EDR
Estimated 
Percentage Point 
Increase with EDR
Estimated Additional 
Votes with EDR
Entire State 3.7 46,605 
Persons who have moved in the last 6 months 5.6 7,689
Persons Age 18-25 7.8 16,128
Persons Age 26-35 3.7 8,030
Persons Age 36-45 3.0 7,382
Persons Age 46-60 3.2 10,258
Persons Age 61-75 2.2  3,397
Persons Age 76-90 1.5 1,410
African Americans 3.7 1,329
Latinos 9.9 5,392
Whites 3.4 38,970
Naturalized Citizens 13.6 5,255
 
Lower Income ($0-$20,000 household income) 4.7 10,316
Middle Income ($20,000 - $40,000) 6.4 24,896
Upper Income ($40,000 - $60,000) 1.2 3,183
Top Income ($60,000 and above) 2.3 8,210
Rural 3.6 18,020
Urban 3.9 28,585
Persons with grade school education 5.5 6,096 
Persons who are high school graduates 4.5 19,358
Persons with some college education 3.2 12,259
College graduates 2.8 7,892
Source: Computed by authors, based on analysis of the Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census, November 2004.
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